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THE STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS A DETERRENT AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE*
(A Study of the Problem in Illinois)
Both the Illinois and the Federal2 Constitutions guarantee every person living in
Illinois the right to be free from unreasonable
invasions of his privacy by officers of the state
and its subdivisions. 3 The records of a single
Chicago court reveal 4,593 violations of this
right by police in a single year. 4 No other constitutional guarantee is so openly flouted with
so little public outcry. The people, usually
jealous of their constitutional freedoms, do not
react to this violation of a fundamental guarantee as they do to violations of the right to
freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly.
-It does not shock the public conscience like
brutal coercion of confessions or punishment
without the safeguards of a trial.
This apathy is probably founded, at least in
part, on the nature of the violation, for in
practice the victims of illegal searches are
usually lawbreakers. The dangers inherent in
acquiescing to illegal enforcement of the law
are hence not readily apparent to the law* This article also appears in Volume 47 of the
Northwestern University Law Review.
1ILL. CoNsT. ART. II, §6.
2 U. S. CONsT. Am. XIV (the Due Process Clause);
Steffanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117(1951); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27(1949).
3 The applicable constitutional provisions are designed to protect the people from the action of
State governments, not from the action of the
Federal Government or of private individuals.
People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112(1924).
4 See note 33 infra.

abiding public. Moreover, the interest of the
courts in the right of privacy is of recent
origin,5 since the greatest part of the law of
search and seizure has developed since World
War I.
The storm center of this development has
concerned the methods by which the right of
privacy is to be enforced. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the right is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it has not prescribed any remedy which states
must provide to satisfy the requirements of
due process. The Illinois courts, in interpreting
the guarantees of the Illinois Constitution,
have adopted the rule which the Federal
Supreme Court promulgated for federal practice: that evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional right of privacy is not admissible in a criminal prosecution. A majority of
the state courts have rejected this view s and
the wisdom of the rule has been debated for
over thirty years. 9
5

Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24
Cos. L.Q. 337, 354 et seq.(1939).
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383(1914);
People v. Brocamp, 307 l. 448, 138 N.E. 728
(1923).
8 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29(1949).
9 Pro: Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv.
1(1950). Con: Plumb, supranote 5.
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THE ILLINOIS EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Illinois exclusionary rule requires the
courts to refuse evidence obtained in violation
of the Constitution when such evidence is
offered in a criminal prosecution against the
one whose rights have been violated, provided
that the defendant makes a timely motion to
suppress such evidence."0 The illegally seized
evidence is not only excluded in court, but
may not be used at all, and the testimony of
witnesses discovered by virtue of the search
may not be received."1
To be "timely," the motion to suppress
2
must, if possible, be made before the trial.
Refusal of the court to hear a motion made at
the proper time is reversible error.1 Denial of
the motion to suppress where the evidence was
in fact obtained in violation of the Constitution
is likewise error, 14 but not necessarily grounds
for reversal.' 5 Where the motion is denied, the
"0People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E.
112(1924); People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138
N.E. 728(1923).
"*People v. Schmoll, 383 Ill. 280, 48 N.E.2d
933(1943); People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d
997(1942); People v. Stokes, 334 Ill. 200, 165 N.E.
611(1929). But cf. People v. Michaels, 335 Ill. 590,
167 N.E. 857(1929).
"2People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179 N.E.
850(1932); People v. Anderson, 337 Ill. 310, 169
N.E. 243(1929); People v. Winn, 324 Ill. 428, 155
N.E. 337(1927). This requirement is based on the
principle that the court will not stop the trial to
decide collateral issues. People v. Brocamp, supra
note 10. Failure to enter the motion at the proper
time constitutes a waiver of the objection. People v.
Brooks, 340 Ill. 74, 172 N.E. 29(1930). The court
may view this as a retroactive consent to the search,
rendering it a valid search. See People v. Matthews,
406 Ill. 35, 92 N.E. 2d 147 (1950).
13 People v. Kissane, People v. Anderson, People
v. Winn, all cited supra note 12.
14People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591
(1944).
15If the defendant is guilty by his own admission,
and the sentence is not fixed by the jury, the admission of such evidence is considered to be harmless. People v. Taylor, 319 Ill. 174, 149 N.E. 797
(1925). Likewise, if the court finds that the jury
was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence, the conviction will stand. People v. Stokes,
334 Ill. 200, 165 N.E. 611(1929).
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defendant must also object to the admission of
testimony about the search if the question is
to be preserved for review. 6
The exclusionary rule operates only to exdude evidence seized by state officers. 7 This is
in accord with the long established view that
the guarantees of a state constitution operate
only to protect the individual from the state. 8
Any participation by a state officer in an unlawful search will bring the search within the
rule. 9 While the courts could readily forbid
the admission of evidence illegally seized by
federal officers on the grounds that the use of
such evidence violated the policy of the state,
they do not do so."1 This failure to exclude all
illegally seized evidence may lead to conspiracies between state and federal officers to
exchange the fruits of illegal searches.- Invasions of privacy by private individuals do
not present the same problem of government
sanction for constitutional violations2"
The most controversial element of the exclusionary rule has been the limitation on the
standing of the defendant to complain of the
seizure and admission of the evidence. The
defendant must show not only that the seizure
was unlawful, but also that the violation was a
personal injury or, as it is usually expressed,
that the admission of the evidence would
16People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421, 168 N.E. 344
(1929); People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 160 N.E.
86(1928).
1' People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 107 N.E. 849
(1935); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E.
112(1924).
s People v. Castree, supra note 17.
"Cf. People v. Dalpe, 371 Ill. 607, 21 N.E.2d
756(1939) (postal inspector led search, accompanied
by two police officers).
20 Exclusion on grounds of policy would not involve any constitutional question; it would require
only the adoption of a rule of evidence.
Federal courts could prohibit the admission of
evidence illegally procured by state officers on the
grounds that the federal courts have an interest in
the enforcement of the federal right of privacy
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and
that they will protect this right as they do that
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. See Allen,
supra note 9, at 23.
" See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74(1949).
2Allen, supra note 9, at 23.
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violate his privilege against self-incrimination.Y
It is difficult to find justification for this illogical union of two distinct constitutional
guarantees. Initially the courts may have had
difficulty in justifying the exclusionary rule
solely on the grounds of the search and seizure
clause" in the face of the arguments that these
provisions prohibited only the search itself. To
to
buttress their conclusion, they had recourse
2
If
the privilege against self-incrimination.
there is any basis in this theory of interaction,
it should also operate to exclude the admission
of evidence obtained with a warrant 26 since the
use of a warrant compels the defendant to give
evidence against himselfY Thus the self-in2 People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591
(1944) (§§6 and 10 of Art. II of ILL. CoNsT. used
together; unreasonable search one which compels a
man to give testimony against self); People v.
Exum, 382 IIl. 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56(1943) (if search
is equivalent to compelling testimony against self
it is prohibited); People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448,
138 N.E. 728(1923) (an illegal search compels defendant to give testimony against self). People v.
Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112(1924), does not
squarely rest the justification for the exclusionary
rule on grounds of self-incrimination, and contains
a statement to the effect that the admission of
illegally seized evidence violates the search and
seizure provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 396,
143 N.E. at 114.
The defendant may satisfy this requirement by
claiming ownership of the material seized and seeking to have it returned or impounded [People v.
Savanna Lodge No. 1095, Loyal Order of Moose,
407 II. 227, 95 N.E. 2d 328(1950); People v.
DeMarios, 401 I1. 146, 81 N.E. 2d 464(1948)] or
by showing that it was taken from his home [People
v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591(1944)]. Evidence taken from the custody of a third person is
admissible. People v. Bain, 359 Ill. 455, 195 N.E.
42(1935).
24ILL. CoNsT. ART. II, §10.
25

A possible change of position by the Federal
courts may be found in the fact that Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25(1949), omits any reference to the
privilege against self-incrimination. See Allen,
.supranote 9, at 14-16.
2
1Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24
CoRN. L. Q. 337, 374(1939).
2 An example of the anomalous rulings produced
by the reliance on self-incrimination and the requirement of an allegation of ownership is the distinction

crimination argument proves too much. Exclusion of illegally seized evidence must draw
all of its constitutional support from the search
and seizure provisions.
THE EFFECTIVENESS oF
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Justification for the rule demands a choice
between individual and public security. Some
difficulty in law enforcement is the price which
must admittedly be paid for the right of privacy. To justify its continuance and extension,
therefore, the rule must be shown to be more
beneficial to the individual than it is harmful
to society.
The proponents of the rule seek to justify
it on two grounds: a "dean hands" doctrine
that a court should not permit the admission
of evidence tainted with illegality; and the
efficiency of the rule in deterring unlawful invasions of privacy.

They urge that, by de-

drawn by the court between the search of the defendant's automobile and a search of his house. No
claim of ownership is necessary if the evidence is
taken from the defendant's home, but the claim
must be made if it is taken from his automobile.
People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 592, 53 N.E. 2d 591,
595(1944). The court defines an unlawful search as
one which has as its object compelling a man to
give testimony against himself. People v. Grod,
supra. It rules that a search of a house is unreasonable by this definition as a matter of law, but that
the unreasonableness of a search of an automobile
depends upon the circumstances. While this result
may be justified on policy grounds, it cannot be
rationalized by an argument based on self-incrimination.
The admission of evidence taken from third
persons might be justified on the grounds that the
privacy of the defendant was not invaded, but it
cannot be said that the admission of property
claimed by the defendant is any less a violation of
the provision against self-incrimination merely because it was taken from the possession of another.
In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48(1951), the
Court has asserted that the fact that contraband
illegally seized was in the possession of a third
party does not prevent its exclusion. The Illinois
courts would do well to adopt this view.
2 Fraenkel, Recent Development in the FederalLaw
of Search and Seizure, 33 IowA L. Rxv. 472, 498
(1948).
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priving law enforcement officers of the fruits
of their violations, the rule will discourage unlawful searchesn and, moreover, that there is
no other remedy which can be substituted for
it. The opponents of the rule answer the "clean
hands" argument by maintaining that it is
worse to permit the guilty to escape punishment than for the courts to ratify unlawful
searches.' They point out that it offers no
relief for the innocent victim where no evidence
is discovered. While they do not deny that
some method of enforcing the right of privacy
is necessary, those opposing the rule deny its
efficiency and offer substitutes which do not
require the sacrifices inherent in the exclusionary rule.3 1 The rule's proponents admit
that some of the methods advocated may fill
the gaps left by the exclusionary rule, but they
deny that other methods can effectively serve
the same function.
Consideration of these arguments suggests
the basic issue: Is the exclusionary rule efficient? Is there a substitute for it which does
not involve freeing some guilty defendants? If
the exclusionary rule is not effective, the "clean
hands" doctrine is scant justification for the
results it has produced. If there is another
remedy for the problem of violations of the
right of privacy, its substitution for the rule
would find staunch support.
The major weakness of arguments either for
or against the exclusionary rule is the lack of
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the
rule in fulfilling its function. Certain comparative studies which might demonstrate the
effectiveness conclusively cannot be made since
the only figures obtainable are those showing
the extent of illegal searches in jurisdictions
where the rule applies. As a consequence, such
figures must be carefully interpreted.
2 Allen, supra note 9, at 20. Similar reasoning is
said to underlie the exclusion of a coerced confession which is verified by other evidence. Id. at 26.
10See the dissenting opinion of Judge Thompson
in People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112
(1924); Plumb, supra note 33; Waite, Police Regulation by Rides of Evddence, 42MicH. L. Rxv. 679(1944).
31 Primarily a tort action for damages and prosecution for trespass. See note 30 supra.

[Vol. 45

A study of the records of Branch 27 of the
Chicago Municipal Court 3 -popularly known
as the "Racket Court"- for the year 1950
indicates that the rule has failed to deter any
substantial number of illegal searches. In
4,673 out of 6,649 cases, 33 the legality of the
method of obtaining evidence was put in issue
by the defendant. In 4,593 of these cases, the
court determined that the search had in fact
been illegal and granted the motion to suppress the evidence. No cases were found in
which a conviction was secured despite the
suppression of the evidence. Figures showing
the distribution of motions to suppress by
offense charged are set out in the table on
the following page.
Careful consideration must be given to the
type of offense included in this study, since
this court does not deal with any of the more
serious crimes. It is interesting to note the
difference in the percentage of illegal searches
in the two most serious offenses studied-carrying concealed weapons and narcotics violations-and those in the gambling offenses.
These figures, coupled with the fact that with
the passage of time the number of cases involving illegal searches which have reached the
Illinois Supreme Court has decreased, 34 may
indicate that the exclusionary rule is most
effective in discouraging illegal searches in
cases involving serious offenses, where conviction is important.35 Conversely, where the
22This court has cognizance of all policy and
gambling cases in the City of Chicago, all offenses
committed within the "Loop" district, and, until
the formation of a special Narcotics Court in 1951,
all narcotics cases. For a study of this court from a
different point of view, see Dash, Cracks in the
Foundations of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv.
385(1951).
3 The term "case" refers to a single defendant,
and not to the prosecution resulting from a single
arrest which may involve forty defendants or more.
11An examination of the Illinois Supreme Court
Reports, revealed approximately 23 cases for the
1920's, 15 for the 1930's, 10 for the 1940's, and two
in 1950.
35Other factors naturally enter into these figures,
such as the suceptibility to discovery of narcotics
and concealed weapons violations on arrest for other
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Granted
Offense

No.
of
Cases

No. of
Motions

No.

Policyt ................................
Gambling ..............................
Keeper of Gaming House ................
Violations of Sec. 191* ...................
Carrying Concealed Weapons .............
Narcotics ............................

2,133
461
791
2,463
513
288

1,558
376
694
1,847
142
56

1,520
375
686
1,827
129
56

97.6
99.7
98.8
93.5
90.8
100.0

71.3
81.3
86.7
74.3
25.1
19.4

38
1
8
20
13
0

6,649

4,673

4,593

98.3

69.1

80

Total ..........................

-% to total % to total
motions
case

Denied

t Also known as the "numbers racket."

* Covers such charges as inmate of a gambling house; violations always occurred in conjunction with
other gambling offenses.
police believe that a policy of harrassment is
an effective means of law enforcement, the
exclusionary rule will not deter their use of
unlawful methods. From observations made in
the court, it is obvious that the police are aware
of the requirements of the rule. Indeed, in
gambling cases, their testimony seems calculated to insure the exclusion of the seized
evidence, or at least to save time in disposing
of a case in which the search is obviously illegal.31A Rarely is any attempt made by either
the officer or the prosecutor to secure a denial
of the motion to suppress, unless the seizure
was legal beyond any possible doubt. Judicial
practice has also contributed to the wide scope
of the rule in gambling cases. If in the prosecution of several defendants arrested in a
gambling raid, the evidence must be excluded
as to the principal offender (such as the keeper),
the court excludes it as to all defendants. In
effect, the judges of Branch 27 have extended
the exclusionary rule to the limits advocated
by those denying the dependence of the rule
on the privilege against self-incrimination.36
A finding, however, that the rule has no
substantial effect on police conduct in minor
offenses does not mean that the exclusionary
offenses, and the awareness of prosecutors of the
futility of prosecution where evidence is illegally
seized.
3A For the supporting opinion of another observer, see Dash, supra note 32, at 391.
Is See Allen, supranote 9, at 22.

rule should be abolished. Unless some other
device can be suggested which will reach all
cases, the problem facing the lawmakers and
courts is that of finding some supplement to
the rule which will deter violations of the
right of privacy in conjunction with minor
offenses.
ThE ALEGED

CAusEs 0

ILLEGAL SxARCHEs

Before examining methods of enforcing the
right of privacy other than the exclusionary
rule, an understanding of the causes of illegal
searches is essential. Five reasons are generally
assigned for the predilection of the police to
invade the privacy of individuals notwithstanding enforcement of the exclusionary rule:
(1) ignorance; (2) corruption; (3) fear of a
"tip-off"; (4) over-technical search warrant
requirements; (5) harrassment.
It seems inconceivable that anyone can
seriously contend that the police do not understand the need for obtaining warrants. In the
"Racket Court," the same officers appear day
after day and watch the court free those whom
they have arrested because the evidence was
illegally obtained. On occasion their testimony
sounds like a classroom recital of the facts
which will render a search invalid. Literature
has been issued by the Attorney General" and
3 The Attorney General has issued a pamphlet,
THE LAW or ARREST IN ILLINOIs, prepared by Lee

E. Daniels for the Illinois State's Attorneys' Association.
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by the Chicago Crime Commissione explaining
the limits of the right to search. There may be
a lack of knowledge of the requirements for a
warrant, but certainly not of the fact that a
warrant must be obtained.H
While corruption may be a factor in the
type of testimony given by the officer, or in
inducing him to make an illegal raid rather
than a legal one when the "heat is on," it is
difficult to prove. It should be noted that a
police officer may immunize a criminal from
prosecution by an illegal search, since evidence
illegally seized may never be used. If the
evidence illegally seized is the only evidence,
the ciiminal must go free. As might be expected, judges and prosecutors in the Municipal
Court deny that police corruption is a significant factor.
The excuse most often given by police officials
for not obtaining warrants is that the person
whose premises are to be searched will be
tipped-off by police officers or court officials
about the impending raid. Although commonly
accepted by the public, neither judges, attorneys, nor policemen seem to seriously believe
that this excuse is generally valid. The fear of
a tip-off, however, does at times condition the
actions of investigators, whether the fear is
justified or not. 0
The requirements for obtaining a search
H BAxER, MANuAL ON THE LAW OF A EsT,
SEANcE AND SEIZURE (1944). This is the most com-

plete work dealing with the law in Illinois, and the
only secondary source discovered which sets out the
requirements for a search warrant in a practical
form,
H See note 38 supra.
40 In the recent cigarette tax fraud investigations,
Mr. Ben Heineman, director of the investigation,
took great precautions to avoid any leakage of information. The raiding officers were not informed
of their mission until the last possible moment. The
judges to whom application was made for search
warrants were selected with great care.
Charles A. Bane, Chief Counsel for the Chicago
City Council's Crime Committee, has stated that
his investigators had the star numbers of policemen
suspected of tip-offs who had been seen in well
known bookie joints. Chicago Daily News, July 15,
1952, p. 10, col. 3.
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warrant present the policeman's best argument
for unlawful raids. The issuance of warrants
must of course conform to the constitutional
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches.a The requirements that the place to
be searched and the property to be seized be
specifically described" are obviously reasonable
since the original purpose of the guarantee was
to prevent general searches." Limitation of the
right of seizure to particular kinds of property"
prevents searches for purely evidentiary material. The conflict arises over the court's interpretation of the words "no warrant shall
issue without probable cause, supported by
affidavit.... ." Probable cause can be shown
only from facts within the personal knowledge
of the affiant, according to the court's interpretation, since by swearing to the affidavit he
affirms the truth of all facts alleged. 4 6 A warrant
will not issue on "information and belief." 46 The
facts must be alleged with such definiteness
that' perjury may be assigned if they are
false.0 The policeman cannot secure a warrant
unless he has observed the necessary events
himself, or can persuade the witness to swear
to the complaint. The "stool pigeon," and in
many cases the reputable citizen, is unwilling
to serve as complainant for fear of retaliation
by the criminal." In certain types of violations,
41ILL. CONST. ART. II, §6. The provisions for
search warrants and the protection against unreasonable searches must be compatible if proper
force is to be given to the whole provision.
ILL. CONST. ART. I, §6.
43Note, 46 H~av. L. RYEv. 1307(1933).
44ILL. Rzv. STAT. c. 38, §§691-2(1951).
45 People v. Sovetsky, 343 Ill. 583, 175 N.E.
844
(1931); People v. Elias, 316 IlL. 376, 147 N.E. 472
(1925); People v. Prall, 314 Ill. 518, 145 N.E. 610
(1924); Lippman v. People, 175 Ill.
101, 51 N.E.
872(1898).
46People v. Elias, supra note 45.
4 People v. Sovetsky, supra note 45.
48For an illustration of the fact that such fear is
often justified, see the account of the attacks on
Robert Niemeyer. Martin, SAT. EvE. PosT, January
19, 1952. Merely admitting hearsay evidence may
not serve to overcome this fear if the name of the
informant appears in the affidavit. Florida has permitted the state's attorney to secure a warrant on
hearsay evidence without revealing the source of
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such as gambling or the sale of narcotics, there
is no "victim" willing to serve as complainant.
The commission of the offense is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the parties to it, and
neither party is desirous that he be discovered
and punished. The effect of excluding hearsay
evidence from an application for a search warrant is to deprive the policeman of the power
to make a legal search in many cases. Neither
historical precedent nor practical necessity
require the exclusion of hearsay testimony in
these ex parte hearings." It has never been
denied that hearsay evidence may be material.
Since the judge has the responsibility of determining whether there is probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, it would not seem to be
placing too great a burden on the public to
permit him to determine the reliability of the
hearsay evidence. Probable cause should not be
construed to mean absolute proof.W Overhis information. North v. Florida, 159 Fla. 854,
32 So.2d 915(1947). Such an affidavit makes it
extremely difficult for the defendant to attack the
warrant on the ground that it was issued without
probable cause. Complete anonymity for the informant, however desirable in procuring information, may be too great a burden on the defendant.
However, relieving the informant of the necessity
of appearing in court, or of signing an affidavit,
may itself have a salutary effect, even though his
name appears in the record.
19 Ely, "Probable Cause" in Connection with Ap.
plicationforSearch Warrants, 13 ST. Louis L. REv.
101(1927); NoTE, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1307(1933).
5
0And so the court has said. People v. De Geovanni, 326 11. 230, 157 N.E. 195(1927). But see the
facts in People v. Prall, 314 Ill. 518, 145 N.E. 610
(1924). In the recent Illinois cigarette tax fraud investigations, the investigators felt compelled to go
to great lengths to satisfy the requirement of personal knowledge and procurement of facts to show
probable cause. They made use of multiple affidavits,
the validity of which has not been tested in the
Illinois courts, One investigator purchased cigarettes
by the carton which he mailed unopened to a stamp
expert. The expert examined the stamps to determine if they were fraudulent. If the stamps were
counterfeit, another expert, posing as a sales tax
investigator, obtained invoices showing where the
retailer had purchased the cigarettes. On the

stringent search warrant requirements can be
as harmful as unrestricted issuance of warrants. The major difficulty in any alteration of
the requirements for a search warrant is that
the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the
present interpretation is required by the Constitution."
A basic motive for the use of unlawful
methods is a belief in the efficacy of harassment
as a means of law enforcement. Harassment is
usually justified on two grounds: first, that it
is cheap and effective; second, that it provides
punishment for criminals who cannot be
reached in any other way. Both contentions
may be answered by pointing out that it is not
the province of the police to decide either the
means by which the law shall be enforced or
that those whom the law cannot reach shall
be punished. If overtechnical search warrant
requirements permit criminals to escape punishment, then these requirements should be reformed. Regardless of their motives, respect
for individual freedom demands that the police
not be given freedom to violate the laws.
Moreover, the effectiveness of harassment
cannot be conceded; its effects are at best
temporary.
ALTERNATIVE AND SUPPLEMENTARY REMEDIES

Other suggested methods for enforcing the
right of privacy should be assessed by two
criteria: (1) whether these methods can achieve
the same results presently achieved by the
exclusionary rule; (2) what areas not covered
by the exclusionary rule they may reach.
A. Tort Action
It has long been decided that an illegal
search is an invasion of individual rights for
which an action for damages will lie.52 Great
affidavit supporting the application for a search
warrant for search of the premises of the distributor,
each verified only the facts within his personal
knowledge.
51
Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 51 N.E. 872
(1898).
2The earliest United States case discovered was
that of Grummon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40(1814), in
which the court held that an action in trespass would
lie for a search under an invalid warrant.
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claims have been made for the tort action as a
means of supporting the right of privacy by the
opponents of the exclusionary rule.0 An attempt has been made to secure a compilation of
tort actions in appellate courts.5 No such
0 Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence,

42 MicH. L. REv. 679, 692(1944); Plumb, supra
note 5, at 385.
51In 40 cases discovered, from 1814 to 1949, which
involved officers and not private citizens, the plaintiffs recovered in 18, and judgments for the defendant were reversed or the propriety of the form
of action upheld in 14. The defendants secured a
verdict in the remaining eight. In the cases where
a recovery was secured, the amount was not specified in five.
The plaintiffs were limited to a recovery of
property loss in eight cases. Godat v. McCarthy,
283 Fed. 689 (D. Mass. 1922) (property returned
because of failure to institute forfeiture proceedings); Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Me. 56, 71 Atl. 70
(1908) (destruction of premises in search for liquor;
$1,000); Boston & Maine R.R. v. Small, 85 Me.
462, 27 Atl. 349(1893) (failure to make return on
warrant; $10 damage to railroad car); Jones v.
Fletcher, 41 Me. 254(1856) (search of barn under
warrant for search of house; value of lquor seized);
Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1(1854)
(unconstitutional statute; value of liquor seized);
McCoy v. Zane, 65 Mo. 11(1877) (warrant void on
face); Westover v. Calder, 64 Mont. 264, 209 Pac.
306(1922) ($2,175 for liquor shipment seized without warrant; judgment for $5,000 punitive damages
reversed) Boyd v. Genitempo, 260 S.W. 934(Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) (value of fishing nets illegally
seized).
One plaintiff recovered $200 for an illegal search
and assault and battery. Caffinni v. Hermann, 112
Me. 282, 91 Atl. 1009(1914). An award which included damages for mental suffering amounted to
only $250. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. State,
121 Miss. 369, 83 So. 610(1919). The only really
substantial recovery for an illegal search alone was
obtained in an action where the instigator of the
search was joined with the officer. Larthet v. Forgay, 2 La. Ann. 524(1847) (warrant for adjacent
building; $2,000). The plaintiff was awarded $500
where the officer maliciously procured the warrant.
Norton v. Burnett, 181 Ark. 1132, 29 S.W.2d 683
(1930). Where the officer knew that the warrant
was illegally issued, a judgment for $180 was recovered. Campbell v. Blankenship, 308 Ky. 808,
215 S.W.2d 960(1948).
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Illinois cases were discovered. And an examination of the cases which were found should
convince the most determined supporter of this
action as an alternative remedy that in practice it has failed to provide any adequate protection against illegal searches. Its value is
only as a supplementary method to provide
damages for the few not aided by the exclusionary rule.
Certain other objections to the tort action
as a sanction for invasions of the right of
privacy may also be made. The cause of action
is not dependent on the innocence of the plaintiff, but his ability to recover substantial
damages may well be. 5 While it may not distress one that criminals cannot be compensated
for the discovery of their crimes, 56 this factor
is important in determining the effectiveness of
the tort action as a deterrent. If the policeman
faces no substantial pecuniary loss in the
majority of cases, he will not desist from harassment. In Chicago, he is not even subject to
the cost of defending the suitY Furthermore,
most criminals and criminal suspects would
hardly invite police retaliation by instituting
civil proceedings.
If the value of the tort action is merely to
compensate the few victims of illegal searches
who would be able to obtain a recovery sufficient to justify the cost of the action, it is
useless unless supplemented by measures which
would impose financial liability on someone
11See Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 285 (1816)
(court stated that it was unlikely that the plaintiff
could recover substantial damages since the property
seized was subject to forfeiture, and there was no
evidence of excessive force; plaintiff abandoned his
claim).
56 Proof that evidence of a crime or contraband
was actually discovered would counter any allegation of malice and substantially limit damages recoverable. It is doubtful if any damages could be
recovered for mental suffering or injury to reputation. Property damage is not usually very great.
See Sandford v. Nichols, note 55 supra.
57 The Corporation Counsel defends policemen in
cases arising out of the performance of their duties.
See also Hall, Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. of Cmi. L. REv.
345, 346-51(1936).
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other than the police.58 Police officers are not
noted for their financial responsibility. One
method generally advocated is the requirement
of an official bond broad enough to cover acts
of the officer which violate the Constitutional
right of privacy. Most official bonds impose
liability for acts done "under color of office."6'
The interpretation of what acts meet this
qualification is sufficiently broad in most
jurisdictions to cover illegal searches and
seizures.63 Imposing liability on the municipality serves the same purpose as the bond
requirement, and it has the additional virtue of
having some tendency to cause official and
public pressure to be exerted in preventing
illegal searches and seizures."I The extent of
such pressure would depend on the burden
placed on the city. There is no more reason to
believe that tort actions would become widely
prevalent even with this guarantee of satisfaction, since the same problems of obtaining
a judgment would still exist.
A recent act of the Illinois Legislature62
18Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 144, 146-7(1948).
Actions on official bonds: Walker v. Graham,
233 Ala. 539, 172 So. 655 (1937) (no punitive damages in an action on bond); People v. Kinnison, 94
Colo. 350, 30 P.2d. 249(1934) (constable and surety
liable for seizure of auto without warrant); McMahan's Adm'x v. Draffen, 242 Ky. 785,47 S.W.2d
716(1932) (both officer and surety liable for acts in
excess of warrant; only officer liable for acts done
without warrant); Jackson v. Harries, 65 Utah 282,
236 Pac. 234(1925) (sheriff and sureties liable for
search exceeding warrant); Ladd v. Miles, 171
Wash. 44, 17 P.2d 875(1932) (officer and sureties
liable for unlawful procurement of warrant); Lynch
v. Burgess, 40 Wyo. 30, 273 Pac. 691(1929) (sheriff
and surety liable for search exceeding warrant).
60
The majority of decisions seem to utilize the
definition in 24 R.C.L. 965 §59: "Would he have
acted in the particular instance if he were not clothed
with his official character, or would he have so acted
if he were not an officer? If he assumed to act as an
officer-whether under valid or void process, or
under no process whatever-the bondsmen should
be held, as he is held, for they are the sponsors of
his integrity as an officer while acting as such."
Contra: McMahon's Adm'x v. Draffen, supra
note 59.
61See note 58 supra. Municipalities are not liable

imposes liability on the City of Chicago 3 for
all injuries to person or property caused by
policemen in the performance of their duties
except where such injury is caused by willful
misconduct. The constitutionality of the
statute was upheld in a recent case involving
false arrest. 4 It will be interesting to see if it
has any effect on illegal searches and seizures
in Chicago, since the act contains a provision
exempting the City from liability for willful
misconduct of the officer.65 Furthermore, the
statute relieves the policeman of all liability
and, unless official pressure is of significant
proportions, may actually serve to accentuate
the disregard for the right of privacy.
A right of action for damages for a deprivation of rights, immunities, or privileges secured
by the Federal Constitution is provided by the
Civil Rights Statutes.66 These statutes apply
to the rights protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,67 and
may provide another forum for a tort suit.
However, they provide no greater assurance
for the plaintiff that he will be able to collect
a judgment than the private tort action unsupported by an official bond or municipal liability.
B. CriminalProsegcuion
Criminal prosecution of officers for violations
of the right of privacy has sometimes been
suggested. The suggestion is usually rejected
on the grounds that a prosecuting attorney
cannot be expected to prosecute the police
in these cases in the absence of statute. Tzatzken v.
Detroit, 226 Mich. 603, 198 N.W. 214(1924) (good
bibliography of cases and authorities). The Federal
Tort Claims Act does not apply to tort suits for illegal searches. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.
Cal. 1947).
2ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24, §§1-15(1951).
63
The act applies only to cities over 500,000
in population.
Gaca v. Chicago, 411 Ill. 146, 103 N.E.2d
617(1952).
6
5 This point was not argued on appeal in the
Gaca case, supra.
66REv. STAT. §§1979, 1980(1875), 8 U.S.C. §§43,
47(1946).
6 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496(1939).
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upon whose cooperation his success depends.6
There is a federal statute which renders an
officer or employee of the United States who
searches a dwelling without a warrant, or
searches any other building maliciously or
without probable cause, liable to a fine of
$1,000 for the first offense and a similar fine
and/or imprisonment for a year for the second. 9
The effectiveness of such measures may be
judged by the fact that there apparently have
been no prosecutions under this law.70
An independent prosecuting agency has been
suggested as a means of overcoming this
natural reluctance of a prosecutor to prosecute
his own aids 7 Federal laws provide for prosecutions for violations of state officers who,
under color of law, deprive anyone of the rights,
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.2 This
statute applies to rights secured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73
Under this statute, a special police officer of
the State of Florida was convicted for using
force and violence to extort a confession.74 If this
statute is stringently enforced, it may provide
proof of the effectiveness of the independent
prosecuting agency. No cases under it involving search and seizure have been discovered.
Any attempt to enforce the right of privacy
by criminal prosecution must be prepared to
overcome the natural reluctance of a court or
jury to convict an officer attempting to enforce
the law, even by violating it, unless the violation is of a shocking nature. In most cases, the
idea of prosecution is subject to the same criticism as a tort suit: the jury will not be convinced that the offense merits censure in a
sufficient number of cases to render it an effective deterrent.
C. Mandatory Punishment
The only method by which the police officer
could be reached directly in every case of an
6 See Allen, supra note 9, at 18.
18 U.S.C. §2236(1946).
70 See Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d
690(D.C. Cir. 1940); 18 U.S.C.A. §2236(1951).
71Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 144(1948).
18 U.S.C. §242(1946).
73Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97(1951).
74Ibid.
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unlawful search would be a semi-automatic,
mandatory action, not dependent on a hearing
before a jury or commission. One possible
method of carrying this out would be to require
a defendant seeking the suppression of evidence
to file a complaint against the officer as part of
his motion. The court could determine the
admissibility of the evidence and the culpability of the officer at the same time since the
issue would be essentially the same. All of the
parties would be before the court. The officer
would have an opportunity to be heard, and
would be represented by the state's attorney,
rather than prosecuted by him. The culpability
of the officer might be measured on the same
terms as his liability to an action in tort. If
the court finds that the search and seizure was
unlawful, it should be required to impose a
punishment ranging from suspension to forfeiture of office, depending on the nature of the
violation, and the number of previous violations. An appeal is not required by due process
and could well be denied in this case. This
would necessitate making the trial court's
determination final with respect to the policeman, regardless of the outcome of an appeal
by the defendant.
A principal weakness inherent in such an
arrangement is the danger of judicial sympathy
for the policeman. The judge may be reluctant
to find the search illegal when he must impose
a penalty on the policeman. However, this
defect may be mitigated by the fact that the
severity of the penalty remains within the
province of the judge. And, on the other hand,
this system provides the necessary incentive
for the defendant to appear against the officer.
It relieves the state's attorney of the burden
of prosecuting his own staff or those upon
whom he must rely. The officer is given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. While this
type of action cannot displace the exclusionary
rule, partially because it relies on it for its
effectiveness, and partially because the punishments advocated are not so severe as to deter
an officer in a serious case, it would seem to
dose one of the gaps in the enforcement of the
75Ohio ex reJ. Bryant v. Akron Park District, 281
U.S. 74(1930).

